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ARE PARANORMAL DISBELIEVERS A MIRROR IMAGE OF 
BELIEVERS?
By Harvey J. IrwIn, neIl Dagnall, anD KennetH DrInKwater
ABSTRACT
This study constitutes an initial exploration of the view that paranormal 
disbelief is part of the same unidimensional continuum as paranormal belief, 
at least in regard to people’s cognitive predispositions. A convenience sample 
of 203 British residents was surveyed for their belief in paranormal phenomena 
and for previously documented cognitive correlates of such belief, namely, 
thinking style, aberrant salience, emotion-based reasoning, reality testing 
deficits, and the “unusual experiences” component of schizotypal tendencies. 
Based on participants’ appraisal of an account of research on a potentially 
paranormal phenomenon, the sample was then divided into believers and 
disbelievers. Most of the cognitive variables correlated with intensity of group 
membership to an equal degree for believers and disbelievers, but with the 
direction reversed. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to 
unidimensionality of a paranormal belief-disbelief continuum and the use of 
questionnaire measures of paranormal belief that incorporate a bipolar 
response scale.
IntroDuctIon
Tweedledum and Tweedledee are mirror images of one  
another… Tweedledee usually addresses the other side of  
whatever Tweedledum just said.
SparkNotes (2005), on Through the Looking-Glass
The objective of this study was to explore some previously identified, 
conceptually cogent cognitive correlates of the intensity of belief in paranormal 
phenomena by examining these relationships for believers and for disbelievers 
in turn. In this respect the paper probes the issue of whether paranormal 
belief and paranormal disbelief form a unidimensional continuum.
It has long been commonplace for a psychological characteristic of a given 
person to be represented as a specific point on a bipolar continuum anchored 
at each extreme by antonymous labels (e.g., ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’). 
Not all such psychometric constructs, however, have been conclusively 
demonstrated to constitute a polarised spectrum. Indeed, some studies of 
this issue have yielded findings that are not only negative but counterintuitive; 
for example, masculinity-femininity, intrinsic-extrinsic religiosity, optimism-
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pessimism, and pleasant-unpleasant affect seem not to constitute 
unidimensional continua at all (Hunt & King, 1971; Martin, 1996; Martin-
Krumm, 2012; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Sánchez, 2011). These findings should 
serve as a warning not to embrace bipolar continua simply at face value. This 
concern warrants critical scrutiny in the specific context of belief in 
paranormal phenomena.
There is now an impressive quantity of empirical data on the psychological 
correlates of paranormal beliefs, prompting the formulation of several 
theories for the development of these beliefs (for a survey see French, 2015; 
Irwin, 2009). There are, however, two potentially compromising limitations 
in this database. 
First, the substantial majority of these studies correlated psychological 
dimensions with paranormal beliefs that had been formed at some time in 
the respondents’ past. If theories of paranormal belief are to explain how a 
person’s beliefs originally were generated it is arguably preferable to 
investigate the impact of psychological factors at the time a paranormal 
belief was created. The study reported here indexed the intensity of a 
paranormal belief in real time, that is, when it was actually formed. 
Second, most studies in the current database have used a questionnaire 
measure of paranormal beliefs in which the intensity of each belief had to be 
rated on a bipolar 5- or 7-point scale anchored at each extreme by such 
descriptors as ‘unreservedly agree’ and ‘unreservedly disagree’; that is, belief 
and disbelief in the paranormal are assumed to constitute the two poles of an 
intrinsically unidimensional continuum. The tenet of continuity is moot in 
this context because the procedure may unjustifiably conflate the 
measurement of paranormal belief with that of paranormal disbelief. As 
Lamont, Coelho, and McKinlay (2009) cogently observe, “after all, ‘disbelief ’ 
is not the absence of belief, but a belief position in its own right” (p. 544). 
Lamont et al.’s observation admittedly awaits empirical evaluation, but 
without an explicit differentiation between paranormal belief and disbelief 
the interpretation of the resultant correlational data is equivocal — do the 
reported relationships with respondents’ psychological characteristics stem 
fundamentally from the nature of cognitive processing involved in the 
formation of paranormal beliefs, or alternatively, from processing involved in 
the formation of paranormal disbeliefs?
A study by Irwin (2015a) went some way to redressing these potential 
shortcomings. Survey participants were presented with a summary of past 
research on dermo-optical perception, that is, the apparent ability of some 
people to discern the colour of an object purely on the basis of touch, without 
any visual access to the object. The summary included observations that 
could be taken to support a paranormal interpretation of the phenomenon, as 
well as observations that could support a sceptical conclusion based upon 
allegedly inadequate experimental control (see the Method section of this 
paper for further details). After excluding participants who previously had 
encountered reports of dermo-optical perception, the residual sample for 
analysis comprised people who formed a belief about this phenomenon during 
the study itself. Among participants who decided it was paranormal there 
were no significant relationships with thinking style [intuitive-experiential 
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thinking: rs(76) =.11, p = .18, one-tailed; rational-analytical thinking: 
rs(76) = –.06, p = .30, one-tailed]. In the subgroup of disbelievers in dermo-
optical perception, on the other hand, the intensity of disbelief was related to 
thinking style [intuitive-experiential thinking: rs(92) = –.18, p < .05, one-
tailed; rational-analytical thinking: rs(92) = .19, p < .05, one-tailed]. Although 
all effect sizes were small and the null findings for believers should not be 
over-interpreted, the observed pattern of findings suggests that past 
observations of an association between the intensity of paranormal belief and 
thinking style (documented in some detail below) may well have had more to 
do with the nature of cognitive processing in disbelievers than with that in 
believers. At the very minimum, Irwin’s (2015a) study encourages further 
examination of previously reported correlates of paranormal belief but with 
a specific cognisance of subsamples of believers and disbelievers.
The correlates of paranormal belief investigated here were chosen for 
their conceptual significance for the explanation of the development of a 
person’s paranormal beliefs. More specifically, the choice of potential 
correlates was made in light of growing indications that in part the formation 
of paranormal beliefs in the general population has something in common 
with the mental processes that underlie the creation of clinically defined 
delusory beliefs (e.g., Irwin, 2014; Irwin, Dagnall, & Drinkwater, 2012a, 
2012b; Irwin, Drinkwater, & Dagnall, 2014). It must be strongly stressed at 
the outset, however, that under this perspective paranormal beliefs are not 
construed as necessarily false beliefs1 — clinical delusions are no longer 
defined in terms of their falsity, but rather are beliefs founded on an 
insufficiently rigorous scrutiny of supportive evidence, persistently held in 
the face of conflicting evidence, and they are accepted more for their emotional 
appeal than for their logical cogency (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). The latter technical definition of delusions potentially could 
accommodate paranormal beliefs among most members of the general 
population, and to this extent it is legitimate to explore empirically the 
possibility that the cognitive processes underlying the formation of clinically 
defined delusions have some bearing on the formation of paranormal beliefs 
in the nonclinical population. At the same time we readily acknowledge that 
other approaches may be necessary to account for paranormal beliefs and 
disbeliefs in people who have critically examined the empirical literature of 
parapsychological research. 
The psychological factors included in the study were thinking style; 
aberrant salience; emotion-based reasoning; reality testing; and the “unusual 
experiences” component of schizotypal tendencies. The nature of each factor 
and some of the evidence for their relationship to the intensity of paranormal 
beliefs will now be described in turn.
Thinking Style
Two habitual styles of thinking have been delineated by cognitive scientists 
(e.g., Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). The intuitive-experiential mode is a rapid, 
1 The validity of paranormal beliefs, or the ontological status of paranormal processes such as esp and 
pK, is not at issue here and indeed, it the subject of an entirely different body of research (Irwin & Watt, 
2007).
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holistic, automatic, heuristic, typically unconscious or preconscious style of 
processing that is relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity; the rational-
analytical mode, on the other hand, is a relatively slow, analytic, typically 
conscious style of processing that demands cognitive capacity (Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). In a substantial number of 
empirical studies the intensity of paranormal beliefs has been found to 
correlate positively with a preference to rely habitually on the intuitive-
experiential mode of information processing (e.g., Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; 
Irwin & Marks, 2013; Irwin & Young, 2002; Marks, Hine, Blore, & Phillips, 
2008; Sadler-Smith, 2011). In addition, a distinctly smaller and negative 
correlation has sometimes been found between paranormal belief and a 
preference for the rational-analytical thinking style (Aarnio & Lindeman, 
2005; Irwin & Young, 2002; Marks et al., 2008), although several null results 
also have been reported (Bainton, 2010; de Vasconcelos & Tróccoli, 2004; 
Irwin & Marks, 2013; Genovese, 2005; Sadler-Smith, 2011). 
As mentioned above, Irwin (2015a) used the task of appraising dermo-
optical perception to discern participants who formed a belief in the 
paranormality of dermo-optical perception during the survey and participants 
who rejected this view. In contrast to previous research, the paranormal 
believers showed no significant trend for reliance on habitual thinking styles 
[intuitive-experiential thinking: rs(76) = .11, p = .18, one-tailed; rational-
analytical thinking: rs(76) = –.06, p = .30, one-tailed], but the intensity of 
paranormal disbelievers’ belief was positively correlated with a preference 
for a rational-analytical thinking style, rs(92) = .19, p < .05, (one-tailed) and 
negatively related with a preference for an intuitive-experiential thinking 
style, rs(92) = –.18, p < .05 (one-tailed). Irwin (2015a) tentatively suggested 
that the different pattern of results across subgroups may indicate that 
previous findings on the role of thinking style were due more to the nature of 
processing in the formation of paranormal disbeliefs than to that associated 
with the formation of paranormal beliefs. This finding raises a difficulty for 
the view that paranormal belief and paranormal disbelief anchor a 
unidimensional continuum. Irwin’s study therefore warrants replication, and 
so the factor of thinking style was included in the investigation reported 
here.
Aberrant Salience
 A behavioural characteristic identified as a key marker of proneness to 
clinically-defined delusions is known as aberrant salience. A section of the 
cerebral cortex dubbed the “salience network” (comprising the bilateral 
insula and anterior cingulate) has been found to play a role in activating 
relevant brain regions in readiness for processing sensory inputs. When an 
anomalous experience occurs a dysfunction in the brain’s dopamine system 
appears to make even a small amount of evidence for an inference about the 
experience seem unusually salient, leading to premature conclusions and 
instigating anomalous perceptions and beliefs (Kapur, 2003; Lau, Wang, 
Hsu, & Liu, 2013; Winton-Brown, Fusar-Poli, Ungless, & Howes, 2014). 
Aberrant salience thereby plays an important mediational role in the 
development of psychosis and other conditions in which delusions are 
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predominant (e.g., Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 2013; Cicero et 
al., 2013). This mechanism reportedly is entailed also in the formation of 
subclinical delusional beliefs (Balog, Somlai, & Kéri, 2013). 
A recent study by Irwin, Schofield, and Baker (2014) reported a positive 
correlation [rs(305) = .34, p < .001] between aberrant salience and an 
inclination to attribute anomalous experiences to paranormal factors, a 
behaviour which closely implicates belief in the paranormal. Subsequently 
Irwin (2014) established a positive relationship between aberrant salience 
and the intensity of paranormal beliefs, rs(102) = .37, p < .01. On these 
grounds the present study included aberrant salience as a potential correlate 
of paranormal belief.
Emotion-Based Reasoning
One influential theoretical account of clinically-defined delusions proposes 
that these beliefs arise from a faulty interpretation of anomalous experiences 
or events (e.g., Garety & Freeman, 1999). Beck and his colleagues have 
identified several of these cognitive distortions among delusional patients 
and report some success in correcting the distortions through cognitive 
behaviour therapy (Beck & Rector, 2002; Beck, Rector, Stolar, & Grant, 2008). 
One of the cognitive distortions implicated in the formation and maintenance 
of delusions is termed emotion-based reasoning; under this distortion 
decisions are reached largely on the basis of their emotional rather than 
rational appeal. 
In a study of schizotypal cognitive distortions and paranormal belief 
Irwin, Dagnall, and Drinkwater (2012a) found several cognitive distortions 
to correlate positively with the intensity of paranormal beliefs, and one of 
these predictive factors was emotion-based reasoning, r (248) = .30, p < .01. 
Proneness to this schizotypal cognitive distortion therefore was included 
among the present study’s cognitive variables.
Reality Testing
The formation and maintenance of clinically-diagnosed delusions stem 
substantially from a failure to subject these notions to appropriate critical 
scrutiny or “reality testing” (APA, 2013; Garety & Freeman, 1999). A similar 
tendency has been observed among paranormal believers. In several studies 
the intensity of paranormal beliefs is reported to be positively correlated with 
poor reality testing (Dagnall, Drinkwater, Denovan, & Parker, 2015: r [178] 
= .37, p < .01; Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, & Munley, 2010: r[153] = .40, 
p < .01; Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, & Rowley, 2014: r[303] = .47, p < .01; 
Dagnall, Munley, Parker, & Drinkwater, 2010: r[318] = .42, p < .001; 
Drinkwater, Dagnall, & Parker, 2012: r[134] = .48, p < .01; Irwin, 2003: 
rs[191] = .45, p < .001; Irwin, 2004: rs[159] = .54, p < .001; Irwin, Dagnall, & 
Drinkwater, 2015, study 2: rs[532] = .48, p < .001; Irwin & Marks, 2013: 
rs[234] = .27, p < .01). In this respect a weakness in reality testing represents 
one of the strongest and most replicable correlates of paranormal belief 
documented in the literature. A measure of reality testing deficits therefore 
was included in the set of cognitive variables for the current study.
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Unusual Experiences
The psychological dimension of schizotypy refers broadly to the presence 
of various subclinical schizophrenic-like behaviours (Claridge, 1997) among 
the general population. Schizotypy occurs in a mild or benign form in many 
people, and only at extreme levels may it be implicated in a full-blown 
psychotic disorder. Numerous studies have identified a positive relationship 
between (benign) schizotypy and the strength of paranormal beliefs (e.g., 
Goulding, 2005; Holt, Simmonds-Moore, & Moore, 2008; Irwin & Green, 
1998-1999; Thalbourne, 1985; Williams & Irwin, 1991). The domain of 
schizotypy, however, is multifactorial, and several investigations have found 
the cognitive-perceptual component of schizotypy (“unusual experiences and 
beliefs”) to be particularly important as a correlate of paranormal belief 
(Bouvet et al., 2014: r[311] = .57, p < .01; Hergovitch et al., 2008: r[569] = .41, 
p < .001; Houran, Irwin, & Lange, 2001: rs[114] = .45, p < .01; Irwin & Green, 
1998-1999: r[192] = .35, p < .001). Perhaps this relationship is not surprising, 
given that some of the items in the subscale indexing the cognitive-perceptual 
component address transpersonal experiences. The factor of “unusual 
experiences” therefore was included in the present study with scores 
computed both with and without the items with a potentially parapsychological 
theme. 
In summary, when proneness to believe in the paranormal is indexed by a 
set of questionnaire items coded on a bipolar response scale, paranormal 
beliefs have been found to correlate positively with an intuitive-experiential 
thinking style, aberrant salience, emotion-based reasoning, reality testing 
deficits, and the “unusual experiences” component of schizotypy. In some 
instances paranormal beliefs have also been observed to correlate negatively 
with a rational-analytical thinking style. We emphatically reiterate that 
these findings do not “pathologise” paranormal believers but rather, they 
indicate the involvement in the formation of paranormal beliefs of a specific 
cognitive style that is widely utilised in the nonclinical population. The 
fact remains, however, that the above findings do not make clear if any 
or all of the underlying relationships stem from cognitive characteristics of 
paranormal believers, or from cognitive characteristics of paranormal 
disbelievers, or from both. A general working hypothesis of our study, 
therefore, was that when the ‘belief ’ half of the paranormal belief-disbelief 
response continuum is considered in its own right, the intensity of paranormal 
belief at the time of its formation is positively correlated with an intuitive-
experiential thinking style, aberrant salience, emotion-based reasoning, 
reality testing deficits, and the “unusual experiences” component of 
schizotypy, and negatively correlated with a rational-analytical thinking 
style. Conversely, when the ‘disbelief ’ half of the paranormal belief-disbelief 
response continuum is taken in isolation, the intensity of paranormal 
disbelief at the time of its formation is negatively correlated with an intuitive-
experiential thinking style, aberrant salience, emotion-based reasoning, 
reality testing deficits, and the “unusual experiences” component of 
schizotypy, and positively correlated with a rational-analytical thinking 
style. 
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MetHoD
The project was a correlational study conducted as an online questionnaire 
survey. The design of the study conformed to the host university’s ethical 
requirements.
Participants
A convenience sample of 203 people participated in the study. There were 
53 males and 150 females. The mean age was 26.93 years (SD = 10.67) with 
a range of 19–69 years. Participants included undergraduates and employees 
from the host university, alumni and similar associates of the university. 
Materials
The study was undertaken as an online survey. The survey inventory 
began by soliciting basic demographic information (age and gender), followed 
immediately by Irwin’s (2015a) Dermo-Optical Perception exercise. In turn 
this was followed, in a counterbalanced order, by questionnaire measures 
of the five focal cognitive variables, namely, thinking style, aberrant 
salience, emotion-based reasoning, reality testing deficits, and the “unusual 
experiences” component of schizotypy. Subsequently a questionnaire measure 
of proneness to paranormal belief was presented. Each of the measures now 
will be described.
Dermo-Optical Perception exercise 
In Irwin’s (2015a) Dermo-Optical Perception (DOP) exercise participants 
are given an account of past research into dermo-optical perception. The 
account contained suggestions that DOP could be a paranormal phenomenon 
like ESP, as well as suggestions that experimental participants may have 
used fraudulent means to correctly name the colours of the objects presented 
to them by the experimenters. All descriptions of research studies in the 
summary, however, are factual. The research summary read as follows (Irwin, 
2015a).
This page provides a brief summary of psychological research into a phenomenon 
popularly known as dermo-optical perception (DOP), the apparent ability to discern 
the colour of an object purely on the basis of touch, that is, without an opportunity to 
see the object. Please read the following account carefully, as you will later be asked 
some questions about it.
Cases of apparent dermo-optical perception have long been reported, but the 
modern experimental study of DOP dates from the early 1960s. A Russian woman, 
Rosa Kuleshova, was reported to be able to discern colours simply by ‘feeling’ them, 
and eventually she was tested formally at the Biophysics Institute of the Soviet 
Academy in Moscow. Accounts of these observations appeared in popular magazines 
in the West, and soon many people came forward to assert that they, too, had the 
ability of DOP.
Some of these claimants proved to be frauds, and one commentator even claimed 
that ‘successful’ DOP performance was due to nothing more than the experimenter’s 
use of poorly fitting blindfolds and a ‘peek down the nose’ by participants. In later 
years, however, a number of people were tested for DOP under increasingly rigorous 
experimental conditions; for example, participants have been screened from the 
coloured objects, have been allowed to touch the objects only through sleeves 
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elasticised at the wrist, or have had their head enclosed in a box; see illustrative 
examples in the photographs below.
[At this point in the online presentation participants were shown two 
photographs of the apparatus used by Yvonne Duplessis (1975) in her 
investigations of DOP22.]
In these methodologically improved studies some participants were still found to 
show accurate tactile identification of colours well beyond that expected simply by 
guessing. Practical applications of DOP for blind people have even been mooted.
Although a growing number of psychologists now concede there is a phenomenon 
here to be explained, there remains a lack of consensus on the actual nature of DOP. 
Successful DOP performance has been observed even when participants are kept in 
complete darkness, so it would seem the effect is not mediated by radiation within 
the normal visible spectrum. Some investigators have noted, however, that coloured 
objects may differ in the amount of infra-red radiation they emit and thus it is 
possible people may learn to use temperature sensors in their fingers to distinguish 
different colours by touch; indeed, some experimental evidence has been published in 
support of this infra-red theory. On the other hand, DOP has also been found even 
when the target objects are enclosed in a cardboard or aluminium-foil envelope and 
the participant can only lay a hand over the envelope. Some writers therefore have 
proposed that DOP is a paranormal phenomenon akin to extrasensory perception. 
The theory that DOP is a paranormal phenomenon is consistent with the 
characteristics of the phenomenon observed in experiments to date, and it can be 
experimentally tested further through the application of procedural safeguards that 
rule out alternative explanations.
When you have finished reading this review and are ready to answer some 
questions about it, please continue.
Participants then were asked to indicate how they interpreted the 
phenomenon of dermo-optical perception, using a 7-point Likert-type scale 
(“Unreservedly accept paranormal interpretation” to “Unreservedly reject 
paranormal interpretation”). The exercise in appraising DOP research was 
concluded with a query about whether the participant had “had any views 
about this phenomenon before today”. The latter item was used to identify 
participants who had not formed their initial view of DOP until undertaking 
this survey; these participants could then be categorised as having generated 
either a belief or a disbelief in DOP during the test session.
Thinking Style
The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) is a 
widely-used index of thinking styles and comprises 40 items relating to 
habits and preferences in regard to the application of reasoning and 
judgement. Half of the items tap Type 1 processes or intuitive-experiential 
engagement and perceived ability (e.g., “I like to rely on my intuitive 
impressions”); the remainder index Type 2 processes or rational engagement 
and ability (e.g., “I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking”). On 
the advice of the designer of the REI (S. Epstein, personal communication, 
September 22, 2011), the scale used in the present study included only the 20 
items for engagement and not those for ability, as the latter are reported to 
incorporate an element of self-esteem. Responses to REI items are made on a 
2 See http://thegiarettas.blogspot.com.au/2011/10/susan-macwilliam-dermo-optics-2006.html
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5-point scale (1 = Definitely false, to 5 = Definitely true). A score for an 
Intuitive-Experiential thinking style and one for a Rational-Analytical style 
are computed as the sum of responses over the respective items, and thus on 
the short form each of these scores potentially may range from 10 to 50. The 
psychometric characteristics of the REI have been independently ascertained 
(Handley, Newstead & Wright, 2000; Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, & 
Godoy, 2009) and are acceptable.
Aberrant Salience
Proneness to aberrant salience was assessed with the Aberrant Salience 
Inventory (ASI; Cicero, Kerns, & McCarthy, 2010). The ASI has 29 dichotomous 
(Yes/No) items surveying experiences of aberrant salience (e.g., “Do normally 
trivial observations sometimes take on an ominous significance?”). A total 
ASI score is computed as the total number of affirmative responses over the 
29 items. Cicero et al. (2010) report the scale has satisfactory convergent and 
discriminative validity, as well as high internal consistency.
Emotion-Based Reasoning
The Cognitive Biases Questionnaire (Peters et al., 2010) is a self-report 
measure of reasoning biases known to be associated with the formation of 
psychotic delusions. One of the questionnaire’s five subscales comprises six 
items indexing Emotion-Based Reasoning (EBR). For each item of the EBR a 
short vignette is presented and the respondent is asked to choose the one of 
three options that best describes how they would feel about the situation. 
Each response is rated on a 3-point scale (1 = absence of bias; 2 = presence of 
bias with some qualification; and 3 = presence of bias). Scores on the EBR 
subscale are computed as the sum of ratings on items in that subscale and 
therefore may potentially range from 6 to 18. Peters et al. (2010) report the 
complete Cognitive Biases Questionnaire has good psychometric properties 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .89, test-retest reliability r = .92), but no data for the 
individual EBR subscale are reported. In the study by Irwin et al. (2012a) 
Cronbach’s alpha for the EBR subscale was .56; this value is not strong but 
may be expected for a scale comprising only six items. In any event, the 
subscale has proved effective in discriminating levels of paranormal belief 
(Irwin et al., 2012a) and therefore inclusion in the present project seemed 
justified.
Reality Testing Deficits
The 20-item Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of Personality 
Organization (IPO–RT; Lenzenweger et al., 2001) was chosen to assess 
reality testing deficits. Examples of IPO-RT items are “I can’t tell whether 
certain physical sensations I’m having are real, or whether I am imagining 
them”, and “When I’m nervous or confused, it seems like the things in the 
outside world don’t make sense either”. Responses to the IPO–RT are made 
on a 5-point scale (1 = never true, to 5 = always true), and a total score on the 
scale is computed as the sum of responses over the 20 items; that is, IPO–RT 
scores may range from 20 to 100. The psychometric characteristics of the 
scale are satisfactory (Cronbach’s alpha = .88; test-retest r = .73), and scores 
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have been found to correlate with measures of proneness to psychosis by 
Lenzenweger et al. (2001), who also report that scores do not vary across 
gender.
“Unusual Experiences”
The cognitive-perceptual component of schizotypy was indexed by the 
“Unusual Experiences” (UE) subscale of the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of 
Feelings and Experiences (Short Form) (O-LIFE: Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 
2005), a subscale comprising twelve binary (Yes/No) items (e.g., “Are your 
thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them?”). The UE 
score is computed as the number of items on which the respondent checks the 
aberrant option, and thus the score may vary from 0 to 12. Psychometric 
properties are well documented (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha = .80 to .85; Fonseca-
Pedrero, Ortuño-Sierra, Mason, & Muñiz, 2015; Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 
2005). As four of the items address transpersonal experiences (e.g., “Do you 
think that you could learn to read other’s minds if you wanted to?”) there 
could be a potential confound in correlating UE scores with paranormal 
beliefs; a revised score (revUE) therefore was also computed from the 
remaining eight items, yielding a total revUE score from 0 to 8.
Proneness to Paranormal Belief
The Survey of Scientifically Unsubstantiated Beliefs (SSUB; Irwin & 
Marks, 2013), labelled the “Survey of Popular Beliefs” for general use, is a 
20-item self-report interval-level measure of the intensity of paranormal and 
related beliefs. Responses to the SSUB items are made on a 5-point scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree, to 5 = Strongly agree). The SSUB comprises two scales 
denoted New Age Beliefs (NAB, 15 items) and Traditional Religious Beliefs 
(5 items), but only the former items were processed here. The NAB 
encompasses such New Age beliefs as telepathy, astral projection, fortune 
telling, psychokinesis, astrology, crop circles, haunted houses, shamanism, 
and the like. Scores on the NAB scale are computed as the sum of responses 
to the constituent items and then converted to scores with interval-level 
(Rasch scale) measurement using the conversion table provided by Irwin and 
Marks (2013, Appendix 3). Scores for NAB may range from 13.37 to 36.53. 
The Rasch measure for the NAB scale has been standardized with a mean of 
25 and a standard deviation of 5. Irwin and Marks (2013) have documented 
the dimensional purity and other psychometric characteristics of the SSUB, 
and generally these appear satisfactory. For example, the strong internal 
reliability of NAB scores is attested by Irwin and Marks (2013; Cronbach’s 
α = .92), Irwin, Dagnall, and Drinkwater (2015; Cronbach’s α = .89), Irwin 
(2015a; Cronbach’s α = .93), and Irwin (2015b; Cronbach’s α = .91). The NAB 
is currently one of the few available interval-level measures of paranormal 
belief. 
Procedure
The project was administered as an online study compiled using 
Qualtrics™ Survey Software (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT; see http://www.
qualtrics.com). An invitation to participate was distributed via the host 
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university’s internal email system and also via a list of alumni and other 
associates of the university. The stated aim of the project was “to survey 
various popular beliefs and relate them to aspects of psychological style”. 
People aged at least 18 years were said to be eligible to take part and they 
were assured their participation was anonymous and completely voluntary, 
with withdrawal from the exercise permitted at any time. The need for 
frankness in responding was stressed. The system automatically prevented 
participation more than once by the same person. Recruitment was 
terminated shortly after the target of 200 completions had been achieved.
results
Preliminary Assessment of Sample Characteristics
Descriptive statistics for the principal variables of the study are given in 
Table 1, together with correlations between paranormal belief (NAB) and the 
cognitive variables of thinking style (REI), aberrant salience (ASI), emotion-
based reasoning (EBR), reality testing deficits (IPO-RT), and the “unusual 
experiences” component of schizotypy (O-LIFE). NAB scores were slightly 
skewed, so Spearman correlations were used for these calculations. 
Probability values are for one-tailed tests after Bonferroni corrections.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for and Spearman correlations between paranormal 
beliefs and psychological factors
Variable M SD Range Skewness Spearman 
rho with 
NAB
Paranormal Beliefs (NAB) 22.20 3.51 13.37–
31.94
–.52***
Thinking Style (REI)
 Intuitive-Experiential 31.37 5.38 16–45 –.25 .32***
 Rational-Analytic 36.16 6.27 15–49 –.31 –.10
Aberrant Salience (ASI) 13.32 6.71 2–29 .33 .36***
Emotion-Based Reasoning (EBR) 8.20 2.06 6–15 .88*** .46***
Reality Testing Deficits (IPO-RT) 41.78 12.56 21–88 .76*** .48***
Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE)
 UE 48.60 35.71 0–144 .48*** .44***
 revUE 25.44 17.73 0–64 .30 .35***
With Bonferroni correction, df = 201, one-tailed tests: ***p < .001 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the sample presented with significant positive 
correlations between proneness to paranormal belief and each of the variables 
intuitive-experiential thinking style, aberrant salience, emotion-based 
reasoning, reality testing deficits, and the “unusual experiences” component 
of schizotypy. These data and the associated effect sizes conform fully to the 
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previously established patterns of findings surveyed in the Introduction. The 
sole non-significant finding was for the relationship between paranormal 
beliefs and the rational-analytical thinking style (rs[201] = –.10, p = .134), 
and as noted earlier, null results often are reported for this correlation 
(Bainton, 2010; de Vasconcelos & Tróccoli, 2004; Genovese, 2005; Irwin & 
Marks, 2013; Sadler-Smith, 2011). On these grounds further statistical 
analyses may now be undertaken in the confidence that the sample does not 
appear in any way atypical as far as this project’s objectives are concerned. 
Principal Statistical Analyses
Of the 203 participants, only 21 acknowledged having previously heard of 
the phenomenon of dermo-optical perception, of whom 7 had concluded DOP 
was a paranormal phenomenon. The remaining 182 people in the sample 
therefore generated a belief or disbelief in DOP within the context of the 
present study, and were the focus of subsequent analyses.
Table 2
Interpretations of DOP elicited by research summary
Interpretation Frequency
Unreservedly accept paranormal interpretation 1
Strongly accept paranormal interpretation 7
Moderately accept paranormal interpretation 42
Neither accept nor reject paranormal interpretation 59
Moderately reject paranormal interpretation 36
Strongly reject paranormal interpretation 31
Unreservedly reject paranormal interpretation 6
Table 2 summarises the distribution of interpretations of DOP generated 
among the subset. It may be noted that the Spearman correlation between 
the distribution of DOP interpretations and NAB scores was rs(180) = .59, 
p < .00001 (one-tailed), supporting the assumption that DOP interpretations 
are akin to paranormal beliefs more generally, and confirming the original 
finding reported by Irwin (2015a; rs[121] = .55, p < .001).
The key objective of the present study, however, was to examine the 
relationships between paranormal beliefs and each of the study’s cognitive 
variables in the context of DOP believers and of DOP disbelievers in their 
right. To this end people in the top four categories of Table 2 were classified 
as believers (recoded as 1 = “Neither accept nor reject paranormal 
interpretation”, to 4 = “Unreservedly accept paranormal interpretation”. 
Similarly, people in the bottom four categories of Table 2 were classified 
as disbelievers (1 = “Neither accept nor reject paranormal interpretation”, to 
4 = “Unreservedly reject paranormal interpretation”, so as to be a direct 
measure rather than inverse measure of disbelief). This strategy then permits 
an assessment of the cognitive variables in relation to beliefs or disbeliefs 
formed during the survey session itself. Note that the inclusion of the “neither 
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accept nor reject” subgroup in the sample of believers and in the sample of 
disbelievers effectively provides a “zero” reference point for both samples. 
This strategy admittedly rules out any direct statistical comparison between 
the performance of believers and that of disbelievers, given that these two 
samples are neither independent nor matched, but as the study was designed 
to address statistical relationships within believers and relationships within 
disbelievers this procedure for forming experimental groups did not represent 
a serious limitation for the analyses.
Table 3
Spearman Correlations between Intensity of DOP Belief or Disbelief and the 
Psychological Factors
DOP Group 
Membership
Psychological Factor Believers(N = 109)
Disbelievers
(N= 132)
Thinking Style (REI)
 Intuitive-Experiential .17* –.25**
 Rational-Analytic –.06 .01
Aberrant Salience (ASI) .17* –.14
Emotion-Based Reasoning (EBR) .22* –.23**
Reality Testing Deficits (IPO-RT) .15 –.18*
Unusual Experiences (O-LIFE)
 UE .25** –.14
 revUE .26** –.06
 With Bonferroni correction, one-tailed tests: *p < .05; **p < .01 
Table 3 presents the Spearman correlations between DOP belief intensity 
and each of the five cognitive variables. Bonferroni adjustment to significance 
levels are properly made on a hypothesis by hypothesis basis (Abramson et 
al., 1999; Shaffer, 1995); in the present context this amounts to making the 
adjustment for each group within each cognitive variable, and this correction 
has been implemented. One-tailed tests were applied on the grounds that the 
relationship of each predictor to the intensity of paranormal beliefs as a 
whole has previously been documented. Note that the difference in direction 
of correlations between the two columns (positive in the first column, negative 
in the second) is simply a consequence of the fact that the second column lists 
relationships to the intensity of disbelief rather than belief.
DIscussIon
The observed relationships with the intensity of DOP belief (Table 3) are 
generally consistent with those previously reported for questionnaire 
measures of paranormal belief. Even the null results associated with the 
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rational-analytic thinking style accords with findings that often this style 
fails to show a link with paranormal belief. An advantage of the present 
study, however, is that the cognitive processes associated with the predictive 
variables have been shown here to govern the intensity of a paranormal 
belief at the very time that belief is formed; that is, these factors are not 
involved solely in the assimilation of a belief endorsed at some earlier time. 
This finding may have implications for the formulation of new cognitive 
theories of the development of paranormal beliefs.
On the other hand an immediately obvious difference between the 
correlations in Table 3 and the corresponding statistics in Table 1 is that the 
former are distinctly weaker. This may be the case for any one or more of 
several reasons. The correlations in Table 3 are based on much smaller 
subgroups (109 and 132) than those in Table 1 for the entire sample (203). 
More importantly, the Table 3 data for the categories of belief in DOP were 
generated by a single response (paranormal/not paranormal), whereas the 
Table 1 data are based on an aggregate of 15 questionnaire responses; the 
former therefore are likely to be less statistically powerful. This issue perhaps 
is most evident in relation to the factor of reality testing deficits. Another 
potentially crucial difference between the two measures of proneness to 
paranormal belief is that the Table 1 correlations index long held beliefs and 
those in Table 3 tap a belief still in its formative stages. The stronger 
relationships in Table 1 therefore may be due to the ongoing involvement of 
the specified cognitive processes well after the initial formulation of 
paranormal beliefs. Further research could usefully explore this suggestion 
concerning the range of cognitive processes implicated in the assimilation 
and the maintenance of paranormal beliefs, that is, processes that take place 
some time after the initial mental representation of the beliefs (see also 
Connors & Halligan, 2015).
Part of the rationale for the present study was Irwin’s (2015a) observation 
that questionnaire measures of paranormal belief may erroneously conflate 
the measurement of paranormal belief with that of paranormal disbelief; the 
bipolar response scale intrinsic to these questionnaires implicitly assumes 
that key cognitive processes underlying paranormal disbeliefs are simply the 
mirror image of those implicated in paranormal beliefs. The data in Table 3, 
on the other hand, may serve as some assurance that this common tacit 
assumption is indeed reasonable and is unlikely to have compromised the 
existing extensive database for paranormal beliefs. For the most part the 
correlations in Table 3 are remarkably symmetrical, that is, for each of the 
cognitive variables the (absolute) sizes of the correlations for believers and 
for disbelievers are essentially equal. This outcome is precisely what might 
have been expected if paranormal belief and paranormal disbelief were part 
of a unidimensional continuum, at least as far as the operation of delusion-
related cognitive processes is concerned. Indeed, these findings may even 
encourage the view that the formation of beliefs and that of disbeliefs involve 
much the same sequence of cognitive processes and differ only in the output 
of the processes. In this respect researchers’ reliance on paranormal belief 
questionnaires with a bipolar response scale therefore may well be appropriate 
for general purposes. 
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Nevertheless, caution should be exercised before embracing the 
universality of this conclusion. For example, although the present study 
failed to replicate Irwin’s (2015a) finding that a rational-analytical thinking 
style is of specific importance to the formation of paranormal disbelief, 
further investigation is warranted on the issue of a possible discrepancy 
between belief formation and disbelief formation in this respect. Additionally, 
the striking symmetry of the columns in Table 3 evidently did not apply in 
the case of the “unusual experiences” component of schizotypy; this 
predisposition seems specifically operative in the formation of beliefs rather 
than disbeliefs. The contrast between this finding and those showing 
symmetry across the belief continuum is intriguing and if replicated, could 
have some implications for cognitive models of paranormal belief. At present, 
however, speculation on such matters should await further empirical 
investigations. 
Broadly speaking, the findings of the study support the utility of including 
both a questionnaire measure and a single-item index of belief and disbelief 
in future investigations of the bases of paranormal beliefs. Compared to the 
questionnaire measure the single-item index is more suited to an assessment 
of whether a predictive variable is symmetrical in its consequences for belief 
and for disbelief; and the single-item index can also be framed so as to address 
the creation of a paranormal belief in real time. The design of the DOP 
appraisal task was intended to engage a range of cognitive analyses in the 
formation of an attitude to the paranormal, but in some contexts researchers 
could consider the utility of a simple direct one-item query (e.g., “Generally 
speaking, do you believe paranormal phenomena are genuine?”) based on a 
5- or 7-point response scale (“Unreservedly agree” to “Unreservedly disagree”). 
Such an item would at least permit a check on the symmetry of correlations 
for believers and disbelievers.
Finally, an acknowledgment of the study’s limitations is appropriate. The 
effect sizes documented in Tables 1 and 3 are not large, so an account of 
paranormal beliefs in terms of processes associated with the formation of 
nonclinical delusions should not neglect the additional contributions by other 
cognitive factors. Again, the DOP task addresses only one potentially 
paranormal phenomenon. The generality of the study’s findings therefore 
needs to be assessed with the construction of a research summary of other 
such phenomena. The design of the study also was correlational, so the 
imputation of causal processes must necessarily be tentative. Again, the 
search for a cognitive model of the development of paranormal beliefs may 
need to take greater account of the diversity of these beliefs (Irwin, 2009); 
different beliefs may well engage subtly different sequences of cognitive 
processing. In conclusion, it remains to be shown how inclusive the “mirror 
image” metaphor can be; in addition to cognitive predispositions to delusions, 
other characterological dimensions such as personality and motivation 
warrant investigation in groups of believers and disbelievers.
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